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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

DENNIS M. SILVER,
Case No. 890138
Petitioner,
Priority Classification 15

vs.
STATE TAX COMMISSION OF UTAH
Respondent.

REPLY BRIEF OF PETITIONER
INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF AGREEMENT
1.

The Tax Commission declares in their brief, that

Utah Code Ann. § 59-14A-92 is a clear and unambiguous statute.
The Commission goes on to argue that the plain language of the
statute shows it to be a "civil evasion penalty, not a fraud penalty" (Respondent Brief p. 9). The Commission does not attempt
to explain the distinction between the two characterizations or
cite any law in support of this claim but the apparent intent is
to avoid the application of Utah Code Ann. § 59-14A-94 which
places the burden of proof upon the Tax Commission to prove
fraudulent intent to evade tax.

The Tax Commission's character-

ization of the statute ignores the fundamental rules of statutory
construction that (1) a statute should be construed as a comprehensive whole, (2) in accord with usually accepted meanings and

(3) under the assumption that each term in the statute is used
advisedly.
2.

The

Tax Commission

in its Statement of Facts

makes many factual allegations but fails to comply with Rule
24(a)(7) and 24(e) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure which
require a citation to the record to support factual allegations.
In fact the Tax Commission's brief does not contain a single
citation to the record to support its factual allegations or its
statements of the evidence or its view of the proceedings below.
Many of the factual statements not only are unsupported
by the record but are simply untrue.

These same untrue factual

allegations are used by the Commission in support of its arguments in its brief.
3.

The Tax Commission objects to Dennis Silver rais-

ing the issue of the Commission's failure to follow statutory
procedures and the filing of tax warrants prior to a final determination of the case.

This issue was not extensively argued in

the administrative proceedings because warrants should not have
been filed prior to a final determination and Mr. Silver was
assured by representatives of the Tax Commission that none were
going

to be

filed until

there was a final decision

on his

appeals.
4.

The Tax Commission argues that they need not fol-

low the usual statutory due process procedure outlined in the
state statutes because no "tax deficiency" was present.
-2-

The Tax

Commission further argues that there is no state statutory procedure for assessing the penalty provided for in Section 59-14A-92.
The Commission then argues that they may look to federal law and
refer to a federal Internal Revenue Service regulation which they
say supports

the assessment

of

the penalty without notice or

opportunity to be heard.
The Utah State statutes provide the same procedures for
assessing penalties as for assessing tax.

The Tax

Commission

just failed to follow those statutes.
ARGUMENT
I.

WHETHER CHARACTERIZED AS A CIVIL EVASION
PENALTY OR A FRAUD PENALTY, UTAH CODE ANN.
SECTION 59-14A-92 REQUIRES A DETERMINATION
OF FRAUDULENT INTENT TO EVADE TAX OR OTHER
WILLFUL, INTENTIONAL CONDUCT.
1.

require

that

The

fundamental

statutes

be

rules

construed

of
as

statutory

construction

a comprehensive

whole.

This Court in the case of Utah State Road Commission v. Friberg,
687 P.2d 821, 831 (1984) said:
In the first place, a fundamental principal
of statutory construction is that a statute
should be construed as a whole, and its terms
should be construed to be harmonious with
each other and the overall objective of the
statute.
2.

A statute should be construed in accord with usu-

ally accepted meanings.
The best evidence of the true intent and purpose of the Legislature in enacting the Act
is the plain language of the Act. The meaning of a part of an act should harmonize with

-3-

the purpose of the whole act. Separate parts
of an act should not be construed in isolation from the rest of the act.
Jensen v.

Intermountain Health Care, Utah

679 P.2d

903, 906

(1984)
3.

Terms used in a statute are assumed to be used

advisedly by the legislature.
Foundational rules require that we assume
that each term of a statute was used advisedly; and that each should be given our
interpretation and application in accord with
their usually accepted meaning unless the
context otherwise requires.
Grant v. Utah State Land

Board, Utah 485 P.2d 1035, 1036 (1971)

The Tax Commission isolates and then misquotes the section of the statute which they contend gives rise to the $1,000
penalty assessed against Dennis Silver.
as a "civil evasion" penalty.

They characterize this

They totally ignore the remainder

of the statute.
The statute, Utah Code Ann. § 59-14A-92, when taken as
a whole, provides and sets forth, as its title suggests, a scheme
of Civil and Criminal penalties.

The statute begins, at section

(1) "Every person who without fraudulent intent, fails to make,
render, sign or verify any return within the time required by or
under the provisions of this chapter is liable to a penalty of
$50. . . . "

This is generally construed to be the "negligence"

portion of the statute because fraudulent intent is not present.

-4-

Section (5) of the statute says "Any person whof with
intent to evade tax or any requirement of this chapter or any
lawful requirement of the State Tax Commission, fails to pay the
tax, or to make, render, sign, or verify any return, . . . or who
with like intent makes, renders, signs or verifies any false or
fraudulent return or statement or supplies any false or fraudulent information is liable to a civil penalty of not more than
$1,000. . . . "

This is generally viewed as the "fraud" penalty

portion of the statute.

The intent here is the fraudulent intent

to evade tax.
The record supports this analysis.

At the beginning of

the hearing the following discussion took place:
Hearing Officer:
As I understand it, in
reviewing the file, this is the $1,000 fraud
penalty; is that correct?
That's the only
issue?
Mr. Dever:
That's the only issue to my
knowledge (Mr. Alderman nods head) . . . (R.
144)
Following some preliminary matters the following discussion took
place:
Mr. Alderman:
The penalty asserted here
apparently has been asserted under two sections of the applicable statute at the time.
There is a negligence penalty and fraud penalty that were both asserted and have been
assessed against the petitioner, and I think
it's inconsistent to have the negligence penalty assessed and the fraud penalty assessed
also, because they require different levels
of determination of intent, with the negligence penalty being—lacking intent of the
fraud penalty. Of course, with intent.
-5-

We would like to Commission to rule on
which portion of the statute is being heard
and what portion of the statute will be
enforced.
Hearing Officer:
comments?

Mr. Dever, do you have any

Mr. Dever:
Mr. Harward and Mr. Larrabee,
it's the tradition of the Compliance Division
that 59-14A-92 as applied during the period
in question allows a negligence penalty and a
fraud penalty.
There is a $50 penalty for
each
year,
a
$1,000
penalty
for
each
fraudulent.
And it's our interpretation that either
penalty may be imposed by the Commission. I
believe whether or not it's the $50 or up to
the $1,000 depends upon the facts that are
introduced into evidence, and I believe that
they can be pled in the alternative and that
the Commission can find in the alternative.
I don't believe that they are exclusive,
and I don't think we have to move for one or
the other or limit ourselves, because I
believe the Commission can determine that if
fraud was not found, at least negligence is
shown, and they can go with the negligence.
Hearing Officer:
Mr. Alderman:

Any

other comments?

No.

Hearing Officer: As far as the Commission is
concerned, the penalty issue is open wide,
and they will determine from the facts which
penalty will be imposed, and they will look
at it. So it's basically wide open at this
point. (R. 145-146)
It is evident that at the time of the hearing both the
hearing officer and counsel

for the Commission

and Mr. Silver

understood the Legislative scheme and the clear meaning of the
statute.
-6-

An integral part of the Legislative scheme is that when
"intent"

is in

authority.

issue, the burden of proof shifts

Utah Code Ann. Section 59-14A-94.

is a part of that overall scheme.

to taxing

Burden of Proof,

It provides that:

In any proceeding before the tax commission
under this act, the burden of proof shall be
upon the petitioner except for the following
issues, as to which the burden of proof shall
be upon the tax commission:
(1) whether the petitioner has been guilty
of fraud with intent to evade tax; . . .
The Commission says in their brief, "In fact, no fraud
or intent to defraud was alleged."

(Respondent's Brief p.9).

If

this is so, then only the negligence portion of the statute would
apply because that is the section of the statute which deals with
failing to file without fraudulent intent.
The Tax Commission cites no support or case law for
their interpretation of the statute.
tially

renders

Section

Their interpretation essen-

59-14A-94(l)

meaningless

as

Section

59-14A-92 is the only penalty provision in the Individual Income
Tax Act which deals with the "fraudulent intent to evade tax"
penalties.
II.

THE FACTS BEFORE THE TAX COMMISSION DO NOT
SUPPORT A CLAIM OF INTENT TO EVADE OR FRAUDULENT INTENT.
The

Tax

Commission

claims

that

intent

to

evade a

requirement of the act can be inferred from the "facts before the
Commission".

(Respondent's Brief p. 11). They go on to allege

-7-

several facts in support of their claim without citing to the
record to support these "facts".
Several of the alleged facts are as follows:
1.

"Silver filed returns only after a finding of con-

tempt by the district court."

(Respondent's Brief p. 11).

The

fact is no finding of contempt was ever made by the district
court.

In fact the court extended an additional 30 day in order

for Silver to complete the returns.
2.

"Silver

failed

imposed by the court."

to

(R. 104-117)
meet

the

filing

(Respondent's Brief p. 6 ) .

deadlines
The record

shows that when Mr. Silver found out that the court had imposed a
30 day deadline

under

the Writ

of Mandate, he

contacted

the

Attorney General's office and requested an extension which was
granted.

(R. 224-225).
3.

hearings

and

"After
a

two

finding

of

district

court

contempt

order

(which was

to

show

cause

later purged).

Silver filed his final delinquent tax return on September 21,
1986.

These findings were finally accomplished years after they

were due and only after numerous administrative conferences, continuances and several court hearings".
The

(Respondent's Brief p . 6 ) .

fact is there was only one order to show cause

hearing and there was never a finding of contempt.

Mr. Silver

filed all his returns, except one which had to be corrected, by
the deadline set by the court (R. 235).
disclose

the

alleged

"numerous
-8-

Nowhere does the record

administrative

conferences,

continuances and several court hearings".

The only court hear-

ings were those discussed above.
The Tax Commission makes no mention of other facts that
are in the record which tend to indicate that Mr. Silver was trying

to comply

with

the Tax Commission's

requests, and had no

intent to evade a requirement of act.

Mr. Silver testified that

he

to

did

not

believe

he was

required

file

Utah

income

tax

returns because his federal adjusted gross income was below the
filing requirement and he did not owe any tax.

(R. 219-220).

After being contacted by the Commission he agreed to
file.

He hired both a bookkeeper and a CPA to assist him.

(R.

221).

These actions were taken prior to the Writ of Mandate pro-

ceedings and are clearly not the actions of a person who seeks to
evade his obligations.
also testified

Mr. Meyer, the CPA hired by Mr. Silver

that Mr. Silver contacted

him and

retained his

services in early 1985, prior to the Writ of Mandate proceedings.
(R. 251-252).
If the burden of proof to show

intent

is on the Tax

Commission, as we believe it is, they have not shown an intent on
the part

of Mr. Silver

requirement.

to fraudulently

evade

a tax or

other

If, on the other hand, the burden were to be placed

on Mr. Silver, he has shown by his acts that he did not intend to
evade the filing requirements after being notified by the Commission that he must file.

Prior to that time he believed he was

-9-

not required to file a state return because his adjusted gross
income was insufficient to require him to file a federal return.
III.

THE ISSUE OF FILING WARRANTS PRIOR TO A
FINAL DETERMINATION WAS RAISED BUT HAS NOT
BEEN ADDRESSED BY THE TAX COMMISSION.
In his request for a hearing dated May 12, 1987 subse-

quent to the summary denial of his request for an abatement of
the penalty on April 24, 1987, Mr. Silver requested that the Tax
Commission
Rescind all penalties which were assessed in
error and/or not in accordance with Utah Law
and Legislature Intent as applied to this
case
and
Recall all affected "warrants and Demand for
Payment of Taxes . . . "
(R. 54)
It was not known, until after Mr. Silver's Bankruptcy
Petition had been filed that warrants had in fact been filed.
This is due to the fact that an assessment of penalties under
Utah law does not become final until a final decision is rendered
on an appeal.

Any warrants filed and liens arising thereunder

are in error and void.
IV.

DEFICIENCY PROCEDURES PROVIDED FOR UNDER UTAH
STATUTES APPLY TO THE ASSESSMENT OF PENALTIES
AS WELL AS TAX.
While we agree with the analysis of the "piggyback"

nature of the state law to federal law as stated by the Tax Commission, federal law would only apply if procedures are not set
forth in the state statutes.
-10-

In this case the Tax Commission claims that the state
has no statutory procedures that address assessments of penalties
where there is no underlying tax deficiency and so they resort to
federal law to justify the assessment of a penalty without following the deficiency procedures.
Resort

to

federal

law

is unnecessary

as Utah

law

expressly provides that penalties as referred to in Title 59 may
be treated as tax.
Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-705 provides:
The penalties, interest and other liabilities
imposed by the provisions of Title 59 shall
be paid by the taxpayer upon notice and
demand by the Commission and shall be
assessed and collected in the same manner as
taxes. Except as otherwise provided any reference in Title 59 to "tax" includes penalties,
interest
and
other
liabilities."
(emphasis added)
Procedurally there is no difference between a liability
arising as a result of a proposed assessment of a deficiency in
tax or a proposed assessment of a deficiency resulting from a
penalty.

In either event the taxpayer is entitled to the same

procedural due process.
In any event the Tax Commission's reliance are Treas.
Reg. § 301.6659-l(c)(1)(i) is misplaced.

Under federal tax law

this regulation applies to the late filing penalty under IRC 6651
which is analogous to the penalties provided in Utah Code Ann.
§ 59-14A-89.
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These penalties are accruing penalties, like interest,
which are added to the tax and collected as part of the tax.
Treas. Reg. 301.6659-l(c)(2) applies to penalties arising under IRC 6653(a) and (b) which is analogous to Utah Code
Ann. § 59-14A-92; 6653(a) being the negligence portion of the
statute and 6653(b) relating to fraud penalties.

The regular

deficiency procedures apply to penalties proposed under this part
of the regulation.

Therefore, if federal law applies, Mr. Silver

would still be entitled to notice of the proposed deficiency (tax
or penalty) and a hearing upon petition for a redetermination.
CONCLUSION
The primary issue in this case is one of statutory construction.

The fundamental rules of statutory construction when

applied to Utah Code Ann. §S 59-14A-92 and 59-14A-94 demonstrate
a legislative intent to create a system of civil penalties, with
a $50 penalty, (negligence) for persons who fail to file or supply information without fraudulent intent to evade and a $1,000
penalty for persons who act with fraudulent intent to evade.

If

the $1,000 penalty is in issue, then the burden of proof is upon
the Tax Commission to show requisite intent.
Based upon our analysis of the statute and the evidence
in the record the decision of the Tax Commission upholding the
proposed penalty should be overturned and any liens against Mr.
Silver's property released.
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The secondary issue, the failure of the Commission to
follow statutory procedures in assessing the penalty and issuing
warrants prior to a final determination need only be addressed if
the court upholds the proposed penalty.

In that event the court

must decide if the Tax Commission followed statutory procedures
in obtaining their lien.
Based upon the Commission's failure to follow the normal statutory

procedure

the court should overturn

the

liens

placed on Mr. Silver's property prior to the decision and assessment becoming final.
Respectfully submitted this ?3

day of November, 1990.

<^C^/# / l ^

KENT 7B. ALDERMAN
of and for
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER
Attorneys for Petitioner
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